Afterword

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This afterword is not an exegesis on the excellent chapters that precede it. Much of what I have to say may even seem tendentious to my fellow-authors, but the analysis is indebted to them. I elected to use this opportunity to ponder questions that arise from my reading of their work and the present conjuncture as it shapes this volume’s key terms – sport, Europe and cities – and to propose a future research agenda.

The political–economic argument underpinning what follows is that nine processes characterize twenty-first-century sport: globalization, governamentalization, Europeanization, Indianization, Sinization, televisualisation, urbanization, environmentalization and commodification:

1. a return to levels of global investment seen routinely in the age of empire, before the First and Second World Wars and sizeable tariff barriers;
2. the redisposal of what Barthes (1973) referred to as ‘governamentalty’ – regions, states and cities claiming responsibility for, and legitimacy from, economic and sporting success. Foucault (1991) modified this term to describe the investment of capacities in the population to undertake the work of growth and governance, a concept animated in policy terms by Sen (2009) and applied to sport as both an ethical exemplar and a generator of well trained workers, in addition to a site of transnational civil society as per the Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA);
3. how European wealth reasserted itself in the management of world football to undermine the voting hegemony of the Global South in FIFA, thereby returning the sport to control by a white plutocracy;
4. the emergence of India as the financial hegemon of cricket, albeit one whose residual subaltern status still clouds its decision-making influence over others;
5. the emergence of China as the first dominant manufacturer and lending power with a taste for state-funded Olympism and a peasant class in the hundreds of millions becoming an internationally competitive lumpenproletariat;
6. the formative role of television sports coverage and the spread of television itself across the world and into the inner workings of sports teams;
7. the role of cities in transforming everyday life and as indices of globalization;
8 the environmental consequences of global sport; and
9 the way that sporting personalities, goods, and even nations have become commodified to earn money for both private gain and the public weal, drawing on labor aristocrats as symbols of a supposedly meritocratic domain.

NICL

These developments occur in the context of a new international division of cultural labor (NICL). The noted economist Jacques Attali (2008) explains that a new ‘mercantile order forms wherever a creative class masters a key innovation from navigation to accounting or, in our own time, where services are most efficiently mass produced, thus generating enormous wealth’. New eras in knowledge and communication index homologies and exchanges between militarism, colonialism and class control. During the 1970s, the Global North recognized that its economic future lay in finance capital and ideology rather than agriculture and manufacturing – seeking revenue from innovation and intellectual property, not minerals or masses. Hence the consulting firm of former US Secretary of State and master of the dark art of international relations Henry Kissinger advising that the USA must ‘win the battle of the world’s information flows, dominating the airwaves as Great Britain once ruled the seas’ (Rothkopf, 1997). This is the backdrop to globalization as applied to sport, which has become a cultural industry as well as a means of training citizens and workers.

The NICL has challenged the very idea of ‘Europe’. In the past quarter-century, the European Union has seen arrivals from beyond its borders grow by 75% (Annan, 2003; Castles and Miller, 2003: 4; UNDP, 2004: 30). This mobility, whether voluntary or imposed, temporary or permanent, is accelerating. Along with new forms of communication, it enables unprecedented levels of cultural displacement, renewal and creation between and across origins and destinations (Schweder et al., 2002). Most of these exchanges are structured in dominance: the majority of international investment and trade takes place within the Global South, while the majority of immigration is from there to the Global North, under the sign of the anti-colonialist slogan ‘We are here because you were there’.

Even the ‘British–Irish archipelago’, once famed ‘as the veritable forge of the nation state, a template of modernity’ (Nairn, 2003: 8), has been subdivided by cultural difference, as a consequence of both peaceful and violent action and a revisionist historiography that asks us to note the millennial migration of Celts from the steppes; Roman colonization; invading Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Frisians and Normans; attacking Scandinavians; trading Indians, Chinese, Irish, Lombards and Hansa; refugee Europeans and Africans; and the 25,000 black folks in London in the eighteenth century (Nairn, 2003; Alibhai-Brown, 2005).

Despite this history, a nostalgic presentism is everywhere. Data from the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press indicate that majorities around the world oppose immigration, largely because of fear (2004). This has led to outbursts of regressive nationalism, whether via the belligerence of the United States, the anti-immigrant stance of western Europe, or the crackdown on minorities in eastern
Europe, Asia and the Arab world (Halliday, 2004). The populist outcome is often violent – race rebellions in British cities in the 1980s; pogroms against Roma and migrant workers in Spain in 2000 and Germany in the 1990s; the intifadas; migrant-worker struggles in France in 1990 – on it goes. Virtually any arrivals are subject to racialization, though particular feeling is often reserved for expatriates from former colonies (Downing and Husband, 2005: xi, 7). If one takes the two most important sites of migration from the Global South to the North – Turkey and Mexico – one sees anti-immigrant state and vigilante violence alongside corporate embrace of migrants in host countries (Bauböck, 2005: 9). Thus far, studies of chauvinism and hyper-masculinity have tended to focus on crowd conduct at fixtures, largely neglecting the wider ideological tone of competitiveness and differentiation into which collective identification against an other so easily slides.

Urbanism

The NICL has both facilitated and been stimulated by urbanization. Almost 50% of the world’s population lived in cities in 2000, up from 30% in 1960. More people are urban dwellers today than were alive in 1960; and for the first time in world history, more people now live in cities than in rural areas. Most of the remainder are desperately poor peasants (Amin, 2003; Observatoire de la Finance and UNITAR, 2003: 19; Davis, 2004: 5).

In 1950, only London and New York were regarded by geographers as megalopolises. By 1970, there were eleven such places, with thirty-three projected for 2015. The fifteen biggest cities in 1950 accounted for 82.5 million people; in 1970 the aggregate was 140.2 million; and in 1990, 189.6 million. Four hundred cities today have more than a million occupants, and thirty-seven have between 8 and 26 million (Scott, 1998: 49; García Canclini, 1999: 74; Dogan, 2004: 347). Across the globe, cities have undergone ‘macrocephalic’ growth (Scott, 1998: 49) to the point where they burst at the seams – not so much with opportunity and difference, but with desperation and sameness. UN-HABITAT (2003) estimates that a billion people reside in slum conditions, a figure expected to double in the next three decades. And in the post-1989 epoch, the crises of cognitive mapping – where am I and how do I get to where I want to be? – have been added to by crises of ideological mapping – who are we and what do we stand for? (Martín-Barbero, 2000: 336).

Analysts have long suggested that city-states will displace nations this century, with urban radials as new trading routes. Cities such as Milan, Madrid and Mexico City are financial centers of transnational media and sport production and distribution. Each has evolved its own logics and interests, which do not necessarily correspond to those of any sovereign state. The study of these sporting media capitals is not simply about acknowledging the dominance of a place. It must unravel, for instance, how Mexico City negotiates its status as a cultural and economic nexus for Latin American social enclaves around the world. The sporting media capital is a relational concept with varying kinds of flow (economic, cultural and technological) that are radically contextualized at multiple levels (local, national and global).
City-based football is a major site of international labor mobility. Players move in accordance with several factor endowments, beyond issues such as talent and money. There is a clear link between imperial history and job destination in the case of Latin Americans going to Spain, Portugal and Italy, and Africans playing in France, while cultural links draw Scandinavians to Britain. A small labor aristocracy experiences genuine class mobility in financial terms, underpinned by a huge reserve army of labor and ancillary workers, each subject to various, and often quite severe, forms of exploitation. This tendency is so marked that it has given rise to a Professional Football Players’ Observatory, which tracks the success and value of players, complete with an interactive online instrument to illustrate migration (www.eurofootplayers.org).

In 1992, Silvio Berlusconi announced that ‘the concept of the national team will, gradually, become less important. It is the clubs with which the fans associate’ (Miller et al., 2001). The city–club nexus in football now sees teams owning all or some of their visual rights, rather than selling them on to conventional broadcasters – just as they had transcended nations, so they are seeking to do the same with national commerce and become global media and entertainment entities. This is how, for example, Real Madrid and Manchester United split their income in 2003–04: 42% (Madrid) and 27% (Manchester) from merchandising; 24% and 27% from television; 26% and 36% from domestic ticket sales; and the remainder from international tours (BBC News, 2005). It may come to pass that such clubs withdraw from local competitions and TV systems, in favor of a world of administration and revenue that they control – something presaged by the league-like format and the primacy placed nowadays on the European Champions League. Manchester United, Benfica, Barcelona, Middlesbrough, Olympique de Marseille, Real Madrid, AC and Inter Milan, and Chelsea boast their own television channels, for instance.

**Environmentalism**

We are also seeing the infiltration of environmental consciousness into the governmentality of global sports. So the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the Vancouver Winter Olympics were closely monitored for their environmental impact. FIFA set up an Environmental Forum in response to critics of the 2006 tournament. Its task is to ‘green’ stadiums, training grounds, accommodation, amenities and so on in accordance with the UN Environmental Program. South Africa used biogas from landfills, wind farms and efficient lighting during the 2010 World Cup (IOL News, 2008). But of course such initiatives do nothing to get at the real issue of such mega-events. Mostly fuelled, if I can use that term, by European travel, the World Cup had the largest carbon footprint of any commercial event in world history: 850,000 tonnes of carbon expended, 65% of it due to flights (Climate Neutral Network, undated).

Then there is golf. Over 60 million people worldwide play this most destructive of the culture industries. Although half of these environmental miscreants live in the USA, the sport is in massive decline there, a problem it is addressing via traditional Yanqui Leninist methods – overseas expansion to deal with domestic
overproduction. There are now more than 12,000 courses beyond the USA, mostly in Europe and Japan, and they cover territory the size of Belgium. Japan had seventy-two golf courses fifty years ago. Now it has 2000. The sport’s deforestation of a country that had been mostly forest has been so comprehensive that lumber is now an import. The next true believers lined up to participate are in China and India; the Mission Hill resort near Hong Kong is the world’s biggest golf course. Again, TV is a crucial player. Whereas the mythos of golf declares itself a conservationist’s delight, based on the notion that rabbits grazing, birds shitting, and other wild things burrowing naturally produced St Andrew’s grass, the model TV course for the four majors (conducted in just two countries, and reliant on keeping people off course for months and months in advance of media exposure) has become the standard worldwide. This environmental sublime is named after that paragon of racial and gender inclusiveness, the US Masters: ‘Augusta National Syndrome’ stimulates a chemical fog of cosmic proportions, and the most reckless water use imaginable, both in terms of the courses’ need for it and the way that they fail to store water as effectively as virtually the ecosystems they have displaced. This is in addition to the cancers experienced by greenkeepers that are probably caused by pesticides, herbicides and germicides (Winter and Dillon, 2004; Environment South Africa, 2005).

Sport, the crisis and an agenda

It would be misleading to paint the NICL as always and everywhere a source of growth, given the global financial crisis. What can that conjuncture tell us about neoliberalism and the future of sport?

Neoliberalism was one of the most successful attempts to reshape individuals in human history. Its achievements rank alongside those similarly productive and destructive sectarian practices that we call religion, colonialism, nationalism and state socialism. Neoliberalism’s lust for market conduct was so powerful that its prelates opined on every topic imaginable, from birth rates to divorce, from suicide to abortion, from performance-enhancing drugs to altruism. It stood rhetorically against elitism (for populism); against subvention (for markets); and against public service (for philanthropy) (Gorbachev, 2009; Hall and Massey, 2010). But neoliberalism had a grand contradiction at its heart: a passion for intervention in the name of non-intervention. It pleaded for investments in human capital, yet derided social engineering. It called for the generation of markets by the state, but rejected democratic controls on profits. It hailed freedom as a natural basis for life, but policed property relations.

The global economic crisis we are experiencing occurred because of an unusual alliance of policy-makers, neoliberal economists, rentiers, and workers in the Global North. On the one hand, fictive capital sought returns based on financialization rather than the material economy. On the other, workers sought to counter the lack of reward for increased productivity and the threat of offshore production by leveraging home mortgages for credit. This asset inflation was supported by policymakers and economists anxious to suppress workers’ wages and hence increase
profit levels while ensuring political quietude (Kotz, 2009; Lucarelli, 2009; Bresser-Pereira, 2010).

It is hard to imagine a better example of collectivity, individuation, substructure and superstructure in tension than European football over the past three decades. Small city businesses that were run rather like not-for-profits, drawing upon and representing local cultures, became firstly entities participating in the NICL, as they sought to purchase talent from elsewhere, then objects of that division, as they were themselves commodified and made into creatures of exchange. In the course of this radical transformation, they fell prey to fictive capital, becoming sources of asset inflation used by rentiers to service their debt elsewhere through the cash flow of television money and gate receipts.

So how should we approach the future study of Europe, the city and sport? I suggest that sport studies has seen three tendencies, each of which is on display in various ways in this volume. They cross disciplines and historicities, so while each may be dominant in one field of knowledge or era, there are generally elements of the others at play as well. The trichotomy I propose implies a chronology, but I do not wish to suggest that any segment has succeeded in vanquishing any other.

Sport Studies 1.0 is a mixture of nostalgia and functionalism, emerging in the 1950s across two disciplines. So within history, we find a fan’s passion for unearthing details of how sports, clubs and national teams are founded and succeed. Within sociology, we encounter a Parsonian/Panglossian embrace of sport as a release for tensions in the biological/psychological/social body, where a miraculous homology between the 100-meter dash and class politics sees meritocracy at work.

Sport Studies 2.0, which appeared in the late 1960s, is a mélange of technical, scientific forms of measurement and coaching alongside neoclassical economics. It veers between kinesiology and management studies, from optimal measures of javelin-throwing to obedience to market ideology. Drawing on positive visions of the sporting and social orders evident in 1.0, it experiments and models in the service of elite athletic and business performance.

Sport Studies 3.0 emerged in the 1970s in reaction against these celebratory and managerial discourses. It takes the form of critique on a class, gender, sexuality and race basis, drawing on cultural policy, Marxism, feminism, queer theory and post-colonialism, and is found across critical sociology and cultural studies.

Each of these discourses has its merits. 1.0 is friendly – it appeals to those who like sport; 2.0 is useful – it appeals to those who decide what sport looks like; 3.0 is critical – it appeals to those who sense that something is wrong with this picture.

If we are to understand and help democratize the future of Europe, cities and sport, we’ll need aspects of all three tendencies within our toolkits. For me, 3.0 keeps it real. But as we know, it offers minimal if any entrée to populism or power. 1.0 and 2.0 make sense to the broader public and hegemons, respectively, so they can make a mark on policy. The trick for the future is to establish whether the three formations can function within research teams, social movements and policy formations.

The topics we should engage with these toolkits are massively complex and pressing:
immigration and the recoding of Europe
media monopoly capitalism
residual asset inflation parlayed through team ownership
labor aristocrats versus reservists
the third sector of sports managerialism and civil society; and
the environmental impact of sport

The debates may be heated, but the agenda should be clear.

References


UN-HABITAT, (2003), ‘The challenge of slums’, 1 October, www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=3008&catid=5&typeid=6&subMenuId=0
